I'm posting this at the request of Shawn McElhinney.
On Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and the Profound Problems With Ivory Tower Revisionist Pontifications:
(Musings from the Webmaster of Rerum Novarum - I. Shawn McElhinney)
This thread was written in response to a private discussion where the work of a prominent Catholic commentator was brought to my attention. The fundamental issue here is one of the commentator in question making very facile arguments and presumptions on a subject with no small amount of complexities to it. And as they are a very influential person in Catholic circles, they have a responsibility for accuracy as well as not presenting their opinions as matters of doctrine or in a fashion that rules out opposing viewpoints.
Due to a desire to keep this focused on issues and not personalities, I will not directly quote the party in question. However, I will accurately represent their statements in a paraphrase format. As they have written similar stuff subsequent to the material I will interact with here, it bears noting that this was written only with their original commentary in mind -though it became apparent to me after it was written that I anticipated some of their subsequent comments and dealt with them in this thread as well. Nonetheless, the words of other contributors in the discussion will be in blue and indigo coloured fonts respectively.
In any event, making a moral evaluation of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki viz. Catholic teaching is extremely murky. It's certainly not the slam dunk "unjustifiable from a Catholic perspective that [certain prominent Catholic commentators] wants to portray it as.
Make a more involved argument, then. With all due respect, I don't think what you provided in that last letter even come[s] close to justifying it or overcoming the weight of the Catholic just war criteria. I think it is a slam dunk.
With all due respect XXXXX, I see this as about as much of a "slam dunk" in this situation as with George Tenet's view of WMD's being in Iraq.
One can never deliberately do evil in order to prevent further evil.
This is true. The question is, was the dropping of the bombs an evil act or simply a neutral act in and of itself during a time of war. During wartime, there are a lot of contingent factors that go into play that do not factor into the equation when there is a time of peace. The rest of this note will involve itself in sketching some of those factors out for consideration by the group. I may blog this later on with some minor adjustments (and refining if needed) but the assertions of this very prominent Catholic commentator (henceforth referred to as "The Commentator") need to be dealt with.
To start with, The Commentator's usage of "46,000 casualties" and the idea that this was a "worst-case scenario" are both blatantly erroneous. I will show you where the figure came from and why (when all contingent factors are taken into consideration) that figures approaching that level are not at all incongruent with probable situations whereas the numbers of The Commentator are. But first XXXXX's main principle needs to be touched on briefly so that is what will be done.
One must always use just means.
It is controvertible if once a war has been decided upon using just war criteria if every subsequent action requires the exact same kind of scrutiny. This after all goes into the subject of application of just war theory which everyone on this thread agrees can have varying applications and from which people of good will can disagree on. Having noted that briefly, let us consider the alternatives to the bombs being dropped to better consider some basic points of fact about the chosen targets themselves.
---Hiroshima was one of four proposed targets along with Nagasaki and two others (Kokura{1} and Niigata).
---Hiroshima was a military complex nerve center of sorts where carriers for the Japanese navy were built along with other munitions.
---Nagasaki was also a military center where they built aircraft and torpedoes.
---The estimates floated about American casualties for a land invasion of Japan were between 200,000 and a million. That does not concern the probable Japanese casualties which were with all probability have been about twice that if not more. If we figure that roughly one third of casualties are deaths, that would mean 65,000-330,000 American deaths and (roughly an additional 195,000-650,000 American casualties).
If we consider twice that number representing other casualties, that would mean 135,000 to 1 million casualties for the Americans and close to 2 million casualties for the Japanese. The Commentator's "46,000" number amongst the American troops is so pathetically misused that it cannot go without comment because of their status and influence in the Catholic community in general is of no small magnitude. Let us therefore consider what The Commentator did not in their posting that "46,000" figure and how badly misrepresented it was of what would happen in a real life situation.
To start with, I remind you all that there were over 7,000 American battle deaths in Iwo Jima (21,000 Japanese deaths) and 12,000 American battle deaths at Okinawa (Japanese killed or captured was around 100,000: that excludes suicides by Japanese soldiers to avoid capture). The decision to use the bomb (and forego an invasion) was made after Okinawa because of the concern that invading Japan may well involve a whole slew of Okinawas. Prior to that point, several scenarios were run by the Joint War Plans Committee with battle deaths ranging from 21,000-46,000 with casualties of 105,000-170,000. This is where The Commentator probably got their 46,000 figure but they misapplied it as casualties instead of deaths. That is not the only misrepresentation on their part in their recent communique.
I remind you all that those figures were presented in June of 1945 and were based on running various scenarios as well as estimations of Japanese troop levels being at six combat divisions, two depot divisions, 350,000 men total (numbers first proposed in 1944), and other elements. Furthermore, they were offered as an "educated guess": hardly the definitive statements that The Commentator leads their readers to believe that they were.
Also of no small importance, The Commentator does not tell their readers that the figure they posited were death figures (not casualty figures) and were based on various scenarios as well as the aforementioned estimates of troop strengths. I will not explain why failure to do this on their part paints a very deceptive picture both of the actual military situation at the time as well as misrepresenting from a moral and ethical standpoint the use of the two bombs in August of 1945.
It bears noting first of all that the casualty numbers mentioned above were later deleted in subsequent drafts of the scenarios for many reasons. The main reason seems to be that in presenting the numbers to President Truman, it was decided that a better estimate would be to tally the deaths on both sides from the campaigns of Leyte, Luzon, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, as well as account for the deaths from MacArthur's island-hopping campaign thus far. (The casualties for the campaigns will be noted further down on this thread.) Considered along with those figures would be the casualty rates of the only invasion similar in scope to what was being proposed with Japan and what happened there.
In other words, it would be important to take into consideration the Normandy invasion of Europe which was the only invasion in history to in any way approximate what we would be doing in landing on Japan. The Normandy invasion saw 42,000 casualties in the first thirty days from among the US forces. These additional considerations were viewed as more of a reasonable estimate of troop strength and probable deaths and casualties of Americans from an invasion of mainland Japan. And though they too would be woefully undervalued, before I get to pointing that out, there were additional factors taken into account too.{2}
To assist in the calculations, it was also asked of General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz to give estimates for casualties for the first thirty days and then for the first ninety days of the proposed campaign. MacArthur estimated nearly 51,000 casualties the first thirty days and Nimitz estimated 49,000 with the three month totals from both of them being close to what the Joint War Plans Committee estimated for ninety days out. These were estimates for an invasion at Kyushu and then moving onto Tokyo. However, these estimates were based on some faulty presumptions and that cannot be underscored enough.
For the estimates of MacArthur and Nimitz were estimates which (like the numbers The Commentator misquoted) were based on an assessment of six divisions and two depot divisions with a total military personnel of 350,000. In the interest of full disclosure, I should mention that those who first made these assessments did say as early as 1944 that an additional four divisions could be brought in. However, that was viewed as the limit due to geographical considerations. How wrong those who put together these figures were (figures from which The Commentator got their misquoted statistics) will now be disclosed by what happened after they set out that report to President Truman.
Within two weeks of the paper being presented, it was discovered that there were four additional divisions which the planners did not anticipate. Not only that but the planners did not know how those four divisions actually got to Kyushu or if they were already there and intelligence somehow missed them. Essentially, they had underestimated Japanese troop strength by at least 65,000 right off the bat!!! But it gets worse still.
For there was also an eleventh division being moved in from Honshu. So if we add to the mix 16,000 more troops, the level of manpower was underestimated by those who put out the report in June by at least 81,000 -and that does not count two more divisions which were discovered to be en route to Kyushu. Add them to the mix and we have thirteen divisions and 113,000 more Japanese troops than were accounted for in the June projections The Commentator cited as the so-called "worst case scenario"!!! If you think this is starting to look comparable to DS's repeatedly disingenuous misuse of Iraq civilian casualties statistics{3} you would be right except (unlike with DS) I have no reason to believe that The Commentator did this deliberately.
Now then, all this was happening and we were still two weeks or more before August 2nd. The latter date is significant because Truman did not want anything happening announcement-wise until after August 2nd.{4} It was also discovered in the intelligence a number of smaller mixed divisions which were not accounted for either. So rather than the 350,000 troop level which they estimated in the report that The Commentator cited, there were actually 534,000 troops excluding the twelfth and thirteenth divisions being moved in as well as the mixed divisions which they discovered. So add at least 40,000 to the number given above and troop strength at Kyushu would be at 574,000 or 224,000 higher than the original estimates.
If we count roughly 11,000 more army and air ground troops which were stationed at Ryukyus (the outskirts of Kyushu), that brings the total to 585,000 or roughly 40% more troop strength than the original figures estimated.{5} And with the original invasion date being set in early 1945 at November 1st, you can imagine I am sure that if the Japanese could practically double their troop strength at Kyushu in two months' time, what they would do with two additional months on top of that.
Cont'd below.
Last edited by Signum Crucis on Sun Aug 21, 2005 9:52 am, edited 1 time in total.
|