Light of the East wrote:
People more brilliant than I will ever be have a different view of Feser's review:
Critique of Fesers Review of You Are GodsI don't know whether this dude is brilliant, but I know he doesn't know what he's talking about when he writes this:
Quote:
Feser is simply wrong to say that Hart “collapses” the distinction entirely. Moreover, the very quotations Feser utilizes prove this fact:
Feser wrote:
Parts of You Are Gods read like a compilation of ‘greatest hits’ from the history of pantheism. Echoing the Stoics, Hart tells us that nature stands in relation to the supernatural as “matter to form,” so that “nature in itself has no real existence and can have none” apart from the divine that informs it.
I must say, I find this statement jaw dropping from someone who has spent his career arguing for the distinction of form/matter and existence/essence. By his own standard, Feser himself is a pantheist!
If you know anything about the form/matter distinction, you know that
matter as such is not a being and has no nature. Beings (material beings) are composites of form and matter. So to claim that nature is the matter to supernature as form is indeed to destroy any possibility of any reality to nature in its own right, making it simply a co-principle. I haven't and of course won't bother to read Hart's book to try to figure out what he's actually attempting to get at with this talk, but it's clearly pantheist in tendency and the brilliant author you've cited obviously doesn't show otherwise, and doesn't appear to realize he doesn't show otherwise.
Much the same could be said for other arguments in the review. OK, another example:
Quote:
What’s worse, Feser offers Nagel’s bat as a counterexample to the claim that rational agents have a natural end in knowing the essence of the first cause. We might be curious how a bat “sees” via echolocation, but it does not follow from this that it is in our essence to have echolocation. This was a rather shocking claim. Feser has written extensively on Aristotle yet seems to have missed the very obvious Aristotelian epistemology of Hart’s claim. For Aristotle, theoria, the contemplation of the forms, is the highest form of knowledge. To quote scholar Matthew Walker: “As the telos of our rational actions and of our other life-functions, contemplation is, for Aristotle, the main organizing principle in our kind-specific good as human beings.” The forms of things constitute both their fullest actualization and their good. Thus, for Christian authors who adopted this approach, to know God’s essence was the highest form of theoria since God was the Good Itself and actus purus. All of this is far too brief, but hopefully it is clear that knowing a bat’s subjective experience does not constitute knowing its form. And if this is somehow entailed, Feser has in no way made this clear.
I'll admit that I'm not at all sure exactly what is being argued here, but let me walk us through the relevant text from Feser:
Feser wrote:
Hart’s second main objection is that any rational creature would, just by virtue of being rational, desire to know the very essence of the first cause of all things, so that such knowledge would be its natural end. There is a sense in which the premise is true, but the conclusion does not follow.
So here Feser presents an argument from Hart, which says that rational creatures qua rational desire to know the First Cause, and hence this knowledge is the natural end of the rational creature as such. Feser replies that the premise is true, but does not actually entail the conclusion. (Viz: it is true that rational creatures as such have a desire to know the First Cause, but it does not follow from that that knowledge of the First Cause is our natural end.) Then he shows
why the conclusion does not follow, by offering an analogous situation as an example where it clearly doesn't:
Feser wrote:
To borrow an example from the philosopher Thomas Nagel, consider that there is an obvious sense in which a human being might desire to know what it is like to be a bat—to fly through the air the way a bat does, to get around via echolocation, and so on. Yet there is also an obvious sense in which it is simply not part of our nature to do these things, so that human beings can live complete lives as the kind of creatures we are without doing them. For that reason, our curiosity about what it is like to be a bat does not entail a sense of deprivation or loss in the way that, say, a missing limb would.
Again, Feser presents a case where we might naturally desire to know P, but where this doesn't make knowing P our natural end. Nor would failing to know P always represent a privation (though of course it is a negation). And having made this straight-up logical move, Feser returns to the specific point at hand:
Feser wrote:
In an analogous way, had human beings been created in a state of “pure nature,” without a divinely imparted orientation toward the supernatural end of the beatific vision, they might in a sense nevertheless wish that they could have a direct knowledge of God’s very essence. But they would also judge that this is simply no more possible for them than it is possible for them to know what it is like to be a bat, and thus they would not feel this impossibility as a deprivation of something they were by nature made for. The indirect knowledge of God that they are capable of would suffice.
So here Feser simply points out that the same logic applies to knowledge of God as applies to other knowledge. But one must take the trouble to notice that
this is not an argument for Feser's position. Nor is it a counterexample (as the author says) to Hart's position. It is the
rebuttal of an
argument for Bentley's position. All the fancy talk about theoria and whatnot is fine and dandy, but misses the point entirely.
Now, the author next almost appears to recognize the logical structure of Feser's argument, because he turns next to a quick attempt to undermine Feser's analogy:
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Moreover, I suppose one could say that knowing the subjective experience of a bat is, in fact, the natural end of humanity. God knows the world via its participation in His own being. If our destiny is knowledge of the divine essence, one could maintain that this entails we, too, will know the world as it participates in God, perhaps including the subjective experience of creatures such as bats. I’m not saying this is necessary; I offer it only to show that Feser’s argument does not arrive at the conclusion he hopes.
The trouble with this is that it is of course transparently question-begging if this "destiny" of ours is taken as natural, and irrelevant if this "destiny" is taken as wholly supernatural.
Then the author continues:
Quote:
Additionally, Feser seems to create a problem for himself—namely, that ignorance is not a deprivation to a rational being. How he gets around it, I’m not sure, but his example is, again, more of an issue for his position than Hart’s.
So, again, difference between privation and negation not recognized. Don't be so desperate to patch up Hart that you'll accept any criticism of his critics. He's just a dude. He's no genius.